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Abstract
We augment Tversky and Khaneman (1992) (TK92) Cumulative Prospect The-
ory (CPT) function space with a sample space for states of nature, and depict a
commutative map of behavior on the augmented space. In particular, we use a
homotopy lifting property to mimic behavioral stochastic processes arising from
deformation of stochastic choice into outcome. A psychological distance metric
(in the class of Dudley-Talagrand inequalities) for stochastic learning, was used
to characterize stopping times for behavioral processes. In which case, for a class
of nonseparable space-time probability density functions, we find that behavioral
processes are uniformly stopped before the goal of fair gamble is attained. Further,
we find that when faced with a fair gamble, agents exhibit submartingale [super-
martingale] behavior, subjectively, under CPT probability weighting scheme. We
show that even when agents have classic von Neuman-Morgenstern preferences
over probability distribution, and know that the gamble is a martingale, they ex-
hibit probability weighting to compensate for probability leakage arising from the
their stopped behavioral process.
Keywords: commutative prospect theory, homotopy, stopping time, behavioral
stochastic process
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1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the following statements from (Tversky and Khaneman,
1992, pg. 300) hereinafter referenced as (“TK92”):
Let S be a finite set of states of nature; subsets of S are called events.
It is assumed that exactly one state obtains, which is unknown to the
decision maker. Let X be a set of consequences also called outcomes.
* * * * * * * * * *
An uncertain prospect f is a function from S into X that assigns to each
state s ∈ S a consequence f (s) = x in X . To define the cumulative func-
tional, we arrange the outcomes of each prospect in increasing order.
A prospect f is then represented as a sequence of pairs (xi,Ai) which
yields xi if Ai occurs . . . .
* * * * * * * * * *
Cumulative prospect theory [(“CPT”)] asserts that there exists a strictly
increasing value function v : X → Re, satisfying v(x0) = v(0) = 0),
. . . [Emphasis added].
At a more abstract level, (Luce and Narens, 2008, pg. 1) characterized problems
of this type thusly:
Most mathematical sciences rest upon quantitative models, and the the-
ory of measurement is devoted to making explicit the qualitative as-
sumptions that underlie them. This is accomplished by first stating
the qualitative assumptions empirical laws of the most elementary sort
in axiomatic form, and then showing that there are structure preserv-
ing mappings, often but not always isomorphisms, from the qualitative
structure into a quantitative one. The set of such mappings forms what
is called a scale of measurement. [Emphasis added].
Equally important is the following (Nosofsky, 1997, pg. 347) quote of Luce:
“. . . we surely do not understand a choice process very thoroughly until we can
account for the time required for it to be carried out . . . ”.
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Even though TK92 did not use the words and phrase “topological lifting”,
the composite mapping they describe–choice function from state space to outcome
space, and value function from outcome space to the reals–is, by definition, a topo-
logical lifting of a direct map from state space to the reals. Additionally, TK92 did
not augment their function space with the prerequisite map from “states of nature”,
i.e., a sample space, to state space–which gives rise to stochastic choice on state
space. Nonetheless, “occurence of an event effects a change of state”, (Norman,
1968, pg. 61). In fact, review of the literature on prospect theory failed to find ex-
plicit analysis of this commutative prospect space. Thus, this paper fills that void
by augmenting TK92 CPT function space with mappings from “states of nature”,
i.e., a sample space, to state space. By so doing we induce a rich topological space,
and show how behavioral stochastic processes are generated from microfounda-
tions of the augmented space1. Additionally, in accord with Luce’s surmise about
choice and time, we introduce behavior mimicking ε-homotopy sample paths for
deformations of stochastic choice into outcome. We show that the sample paths
are stopped behavioral processes, and that for fair lotteries they are local martin-
gales 2 under CPT probability weighting scheme.
1Our methodology is distinguished from that popularized in the literature on stochastic models of learning. See
Wickens (1982). A qualitative paper by Steinbacher (2009) used “buzz words” and “catch phrases” to discuss related
issues, but did not introduce a parametrized model of behavioral stochastic process.
2Tangentially related papers by Nosofsky (1997) and Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) deal with subjects’ retrieval time
from memory for objects that are similar to exemplars. Even though a random walk model fitted their experimental
data, their approach is qualitatively different from that in this paper. Recently, Lindquist and McKeague (2009)
proposed a logit model with Brownian-like predictors that may be closest to ours. However, their model was adaptive
and based on observations in fMRI and other medical experiments. Our model is normative in the context of the
augmented CPT function space
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In section 2 we introduce basic definitions, and the commutative map of
prospect theory’s function space including its sample space augment. In subsec-
tion 3.1 we introduce the main result of a behavioral homotopic lifting which
serves as the foundation for construction of a behavioral stochastic process in sub-
section 3.2. In subsection 3.2 we show how behavioral stochastic processes are
uniformly stopped just short of reaching a goal in space-time. In section 4 we
apply our theory to fair gambles, and report results under various scenarios of
probability weighting. Section 5 concludes with perspectives for further research.
2 Commutative Map of Prospect Theory’s Augmented Func-
tion Space
To keep track of the myriad liftings and composite maps in Prospect Theory’s
function space, we modify the old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words” to
“a commutative map is worth a thousand words”. The diagram in Figure 1 plainly
X
vpp
ppp
pp
xxppp
ppp
p
R Sgoo
f
OO
P(Ω)woo
w˜
gg
Ω
Y WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
kkWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
Poo
Figure 1: Commutative Map of Prospect Theory’s Liftings
shows that the stochastic choice map f is a lifting of the imputed direct map g =
v◦ f from state space S to the realsR. Further, v is a functional, of f , on X . So any
action on v that yields another functional is an operator by definition. Compare
Tversky and Khaneman (1992) mapping scheme in the introduction section 1 of
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this paper. Additionally, the composite direct map g◦ (w◦P) = v◦Y , from sample
spaceΩ to the realsR, is a lifting of Y . In that case, for a given outcome x∈ X , the
map v(Y (ω)) is a functional. Thus, any action averaging over that quantity gives
rise to an averaging operator. Further, the probability weight function w is a lifting
of the direct map w˜= f ◦w from P(Ω) to S. Perhaps most important, the composite
map w ◦P is a lifting of the direct map Y = f ◦ (w ◦P) from sample space Ω to
outcome space X . The stochastic choice functions in extant literature, see e.g.,
Debreu (1958) and McFadden (1974), considers a mapping P :Ω→ S. But not the
intermittent composite mapping w : P(Ω)→ S which embeds probability weights
in state space S, and indirectly in X through choice function f or directly through
the composite w˜. The commutative map plainly shows that the introduction of
probability weighting map w should be incorporated in any stochastic choice map
f : S→ X to account for probability distortions. In fact, Figure 1 includes the
following complimentary space3 that is the sui generis of this paper.
Definition 2.1 (Prospect Theory’s Complimentary Space). Let A, B, C be the
[dense] space bounded by the commutative map–defined respectively by
A = |SXRS| (2.1)
B = |SXP(Ω)S| (2.2)
C = |ΩP(Ω)XΩ| (2.3)
3Our useage of “complimentary space” is different from common useage in Hilbert space theory. Even though
one could perhaps treat the commutative map as one that includes vector valued functions. In which case, if |−→ΩX | is
orthogonal to |−→XR|, the complimentary angles subtended at X could be used to “define” the “complimentary space”
they subtend.
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LetM be Prospect Theory’s function space such thatM = A⊕B⊕C. Then B⊕
C =M	A is Prospect Theory’s complimentary space. Notationally we write Ac
for PT complimentary space. 
Prospect Theory tends to focus on the space A in (2.1). In this paper, we focus
on the spaceM	A or Ac.
The mapping Y in Figure 1 has the following interpretation. Since Y :Ω→
X ⇒ Y (Ω) ⊆ X , there exists a lottery {(x1, p1),(x2, p2), . . . ,(xn, pn)} or gamble
such that Y (ω) takes the values (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) with corresponding joint proba-
bility distribution (p1, p2, . . . , pn). So that for a given realization of outcomes,
Yi(ω) = f ◦ (w◦ pi) = f (w(pi)) = (xi, pi)∼= xi(pi), for some index i. Additionally,
let FY be the probability distribution function of Y . So that for rank ordered Y we
have the relation piy = w(F+Y (y))−w(F−Y (y)) as the probability weight assigned
to the simple lottery at the jump of F . In any event, the commutative diagram
plainly shows how probabilities and or probability weights are embedded in out-
come space X . The rest of this paper constitutes analytic proofs of these facts
according as they apply to Cumulative Prospect Theory or otherwise.
3 Behavioral Stochastic Process
In this section we introduce the homotopy concept and use it to identify a
behavioral stochastic process in PT function space.
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3.1 Behavior mimicking homotopy
The following definitions are critical to this paper.
Definition 3.1 (Homotopy, deformation, path). [(Lefshetz, 1942, pg. 39)].
Let A, B be topological spaces andI be the unit intervalI = {u|0≤ u≤ 1}. Two
mappings, t1, t2 : A→ B are said to be homotopic whenever there is a mapping
T :I ×A :→ B such that T (0,x) = t1(x), and T (1,x) = t2(x) for x ∈ A. If t1 = 1A
is the identity map, so that A⊂ B, then t2 is a deformation. The set T (I ,x) is the
path of x. Whenever the spaces are metric, and the paths are all of diameter less
than ε , we have an ε-homotopy, or an ε-homotopy as the case may be.
Definition 3.2 (Homotopy Lifting Property). (Gray, 1975, pg. 79).
For any homotopy ψ˜ : [0,1]×Ω→ S, and for any map Y lifting ψ˜ , there exist a
homotopy ψ : [0,1]×Ω→ X lifting ψ˜ with Y = ψ˜|[0,1]×Ω.
The commutative map in Figure 2 depicts the homotopy lifting property enun-
ciated in 3.2. According to Figure 1 the mapping Y and f ◦ (w◦P) are candidates
Ω

**
Y // X
Ω× [0,1]
ψiiiiiii
44iiiiiiiiiiii
ψ˜ // S
OO
Figure 2: Prospect Theory’s Homotopy Lifting of State Space
for homotopy maps from Ω to X . Specifically, let ψ(0,ω) = f ◦ (w ◦P)(ω) and
ψ(1,ω) = Y (ω) for some realized sample point ω . If the stochastic choice com-
posite map f ◦ (w ◦P)(ω) is a continuous deformation of Y (ω), then ψ(t,ω) is
7
an intermediate sample path of the deformation of f ◦ (w ◦P)(ω) into Y (ω) at
some intermediate “time” t4. In other words, technically, if F =F
t(n)1
⊆F
t(n)2
⊆
. . .F
t(n)2n
is a right filtration of the paths in [0,1] for a dyadic partition of [0,1],
then there is a progressively measureable [discretized] behavioral path process
ψ = {ψ(t,ω), Ft ; t(n)k−1 ≤ t < t
(n)
k ,k = 1,2, . . . ,2
n} that describes the deformation
of stochastic choice function to a random variable in outcome space. That is, for
t(n)k = k.2
−n fixed, we have the approximate “coordinate mapping”ψ(t,ω)≈Y (ω)
which translates to an ε-homotopy sample path
ψ(t(n)k ,ω) = Y (ω)+η(t
(n)
k ,ω) (3.1)
where η is an idiosyncratic “ε” error term. This implies observation that subjects
change their mind over time, and that the behavior mimicking deformation ψ mea-
sures Y with error. It also, identifies Luce’s conjecture that our understanding of a
choice process is enhanced by accounting for the time taken to make it. See also,
(Davidson and Marschak, 1958, pg. 1). In fact, we can write
ψ(t(n)k ,ω) = (1− t
(n)
k )( f ◦w◦P)(ω)+ t
(n)
k Y (ω) (3.2)
which plainly show that ψ is an intermediate map5 between stochastic choice f ◦
w◦P, and outcome Y (ω) for “time” evolution t(n)k .
4Technically, we should write f ◦ (w ◦P)(t,ω) as the intermediate map at “time” t. However, it is notationally
cumbersome.
5See (Allgower and Georg, 1994, pp. 77-80) for numerical implementation of this algorithm
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3.2 Psychological distance and stopped behavioral processes
Due to measurement error or otherwise, the homotopy process is “stopped”
by a subject before the choice deformation process is completed. So we want to
measure the closeness of the stopped process to the target Y (ω). According to
(Nosofsky, 1997, pg. 348) there exist a psychological distance6 between ψ and Y
which, in our case, can be represented by the metric
ρ(ψ,Y ) = sup
1≤k≤2n
|ψ(t(n)k ,ω)−Y (ω)| (3.3)
This gives rise to the stopping time
τε = inf{t > 0; |ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε(ρ(·)} (3.4)
Nosofsky (1997); Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) also report that ε ↓ 0 as follows7.
For instance, they show that the similarity or proximity of the two functions8 is an
exponential decay of their distance as follows
ε(ρ) = exp(−cρ) (3.5)
6Recall that f ◦w ◦P ' Y . Nosofsky used a weighted Euclidean distance function which, in the context of our
model, is written as ρ(ψ, f ) = (∑2
n
j=1 w j|ψ(t(n)k ,ω)− f |2)
1
2 , where w j is the attention weight given to distance. See
also, Massa and Simonov (2005) who used a similar metric based on conditional variance from a Kalman filter of
agents learning about stock prices. For instance, they posit Xt+1 = AXt + ut and Rt = BXt + vt , where Xt is the state
of the economy at time t, Rt is a vector of portfolio returns, and LUt = var[Xt+1|R1, · · · ,Rt ] is the “learning” metric.
Inasmuch as our agents probability weights are included in the composite function f ◦w◦P we exclude w j. Cf. Dawes
(1979). Also, in keeping with standard metric in function space we used a sup-norm.
7(Norman, 1968, pg. 63) describes ρ as a distance diminishing function.
8Nosofsky used distance between exemplars i, j and used i j subscript notation. Our distance ρ is functionally
equivalent to their di j distance notation.
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for some constant c. They let M j be the strength of conviction for a given choice
where i, j ∈ {ψ,Y}, so that the degree to which, say, choice j is preferred is
a j(ρ) = M jε(ρ) (3.6)
They also posit that the probability that the choice j is made at time t is given by
f (t) = a j(ρ)exp(−a j(ρ)t) (3.7)
(Baucells and Heukamp, 2009, pg. 3) introduced a probabiliity time depen-
dent model (“PTT”) by adding a probability dimension to an outcome space do-
main. They argue that probability and time are nonseperable such that an ex-
pected value function V (x, p, t) is time dependent through time dependent proba-
bility. Further, they characterized the ’total psychological distance” a = z+ r(x)t
where z = − ln(p), r(x)” is a ”fade rate”, and t is time. Op. cit. pp. 11, 14.
Given a psychological distance function d(·), they proposed a density function
f (a) = exp(−d(a)). In the context of out parametrization, their density function
is
f (ρ, t) = exp(−ρ(z+ r(x)t)) (3.8)
where
z =− ln(p), ;r(x) is a “fade rate” and t is time (3.9)
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Those parametrizations above seem to be fairly standard in the quantitative psy-
chology literature on learning. See e.g., Norman (1968).
In our case, we modify Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) time based density
to space time (ρ, t) by adding a space dimension ρ . Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ M < ∞. For
the purpose of exposition, let a j(ρ) = ρ . So that f (ρ, t) = ρ exp(−ρt). For our
Lebesgue density f (ρ, t) we need the following normalization
∫ M
0
∫ ∞
0
f (ρ, t)dρdt = 1 f (ρ, t) =
ρ exp(−ρt)
M
(3.10)
where 0≤ ρ ≤M < ∞. Let
α = Pr{|ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε(ρ)} (3.11)
β = 1−Pr{|ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε(ρ)} (3.12)
Integration by parts shows that for ε(ρ) = ε > 0, the probability of the intermedi-
ate homotopy sample path process being stopped is
Pr{|ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε}= 1
M
(
1−
∫ ε
0
ρ exp(−ρt)dρ
)
(3.13)
=
1
M
(
1+
ε
t
exp(−εt)− 1
t2
(1− exp(−εt)
)
(3.14)
For small ε , after some elementary algebra, that quantity reduces to
Pr{|ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε}= 1
M
(1− ε2) (3.15)
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Despite our [nonseperable] space-time modification of probability density in Equa-
tion 3.10, the probability Pr{|ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)| > ε} = 1M(1− ε2) is not time de-
pendent9. In fact, we have the following
Proposition 3.1. ψ(t,ω) is well defined for small probabilities.
Proof. Dudley (1967) introduced a class of probability metrics that diminishes
with distance. For instance,
Pr{|ψ−µψ | ≥ ε} ≤ 2exp(− ε22L2 )≈ 2(1−
ε2
2L2
) (3.16)
where ψ is a Lipschitz continuous function with Lipschitz constant L, P is a Gaus-
sian measure, and µψ is measure of location such as the mean or median of ψ .
See e.g., (Massart, 1998, pg. 1), and Talagrand (2005) for a review and exten-
sions. Since the behavioral process ψ(t,ω) must satisfy Kolmmogov’s continuity
criterion, see (Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, pg. 53), it must satisfy the stronger
Lipschitz condition. Thus, after elementary algebra, from Equation 3.16 we get
ε2 =
2− 1M
1
L2 − 1M
(3.17)
Since ε2 > 0 this reduces to L< |M|12 . Which implies
|ψ(t,ω)−ψ(s,ω)| ≤ |M|12 |s− t|<M(s− t)2 (3.18)
9This result implicates Baucells and Heukamp (2009) and our space-time probability density for small probabili-
ties. It implies that our space time probability density function is slow varying in time. In fact, for any small ε , that
probability is zero only if M→ ∞: an absurdity.
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Thus, ψ is a well defined process that satisfies Kolmogorov’s continuity criterion.
Thus, the probability α of the process being stopped is uniform across time. If
α , is large, then the probability of it not being stopped, β = 1−α , is small. Un-
der CPT, subjects overweigh β with w(β ) and underweigh α with w(α) provided
α < pe < β . So even though ψ(t ∧ τε ,ω) is a stopped stochastic choice process
with probability α of being stopped before attaining the goal Y (ω), agents under-
estimate that process with distorted probability w(α). These de facto statistical
inference about stochastic choice functions show that even Type I and Type II er-
ror are subject to distortion. For subjects tend to accept a stochastic choice process
when they should reject it,, and vice versa. The foregoimg analysis gives rise to
the following
Proposition 3.2. Let f (ρ, t) = ρ exp(−ρt)M be a space-time probability density func-
tion, with psychological distance ρ , where 0≤ ρ ≤M < ∞; 0≤ t ≤ ∞, and
τε = inf{t > 0; |ψ(t,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε(ρ)}
be a stopping time for the stochastic choice process ψ , where ε(ρ) ↓ 0. Then for
any small ε the process is uniformly stopped with probability α = 1M(1− ε2).
In addition to the foregoing, the following corollary is motivated by (Shao,
2007, pp. 129-131).
13
Corollary 3.3. Let C(Y (ω)) = {ε| |ψ(·)−Y (ω)| ≤ ε} be a confidence set for a
sampled lottery Y (ω), and w(·) be a probability weighting function. H0 :ψ(t,ω)=
Y (ω) be the null hypothesis being tested against the alternative Ha : ψ(t,ω) 6=
Y (ω). So that Pr{ψ /∈ C(Y )} ≤ α . Let α small be the objective probability of
Type I error–H0 is rejected when it is true, given the realized sample path ω ∈Ω.
Then the subjective probability of Type I error is given by w(α) > α , and vice
versa for Type II error.
3.2.1 Behavioral submartingale processes
In this section we show how the stochastic choice problem evolves by and
through intermediate homotopic maps, and construct a behavioral submartingale
process for fair lotteries. As a preliminary matter, we have the following
Proposition 3.4. The process ψ = {ψ(t(n)k ,ω),Ft(n)k ;1 ≤ k ≤ 2
n < ∞} is well de-
fined.
Proof. In proposition 3.1 we showed that ψ is well defined for small probabilities.
Now we extend that definition to stopping times. From Equation 3.2, we use the
stopped behavioral hypothesis as follows.
sup
k
∣∣∣ψ(t(n)k ∧ τε ,ω)−Y (ω)∣∣∣= sup
k
(1− t(n)k ∧ τε) | f ◦w◦P−Y (ω)| (3.19)
⇒ (1− τε)(ε+δ )> ε (3.20)
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for some δ > 0 so that
τε < 1− ε
ε+δ
< 1 (3.21)
The latter relation is true for all δ > 0. Hence the proof is done.
Definition 3.3. LetH be the convex hull of homotopic maps in the commutative
map in Figure 1. Then
H = {
2n
∑
k=1
(1− t(n)k ) f ◦w◦P+ t
(n)
k Y | Y ∈ X , and f ◦w◦P ∈ X} (3.22)
At this point we introduce the following
Lemma 3.5. If agents rank order outcomes x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(n), then they rank order
gambles [or lotteries] Y(1),Y(2), . . . ,Y(n).
Proof. The proof is by induction. Let Y1 , (x1, p1;0,1− p1) be a simple lottery in
X×P. In what follows we suppress 0,1− p. Let
Yn , {(x1, p1),(x2, p2), . . . ,(xn, pn)} ∈
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
X×·· ·×X×
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
P×·· ·×P (3.23)
be a lottery. Let
Y2 , {(x1, p1);(x2, p2)} ∈
︷ ︸︸ ︷
X×X×
︷ ︸︸ ︷
P×P (3.24)
be another lottery. According to CPT agents rank order outcomes when formu-
lating decisions under risk and uncertainty. So that if outcomes in Y2 are ranked
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we write Y(2) , {(x(1), p1);(x(2), p2)}. It is clear that Y(2) , Y(1) ∪ {(x(2), p2)}.
Since the recursive ranked outcome-lottery relation holds for Y(1) and Y(2), it holds
for ranked lotteries Y(1),Y(2), . . . ,Y(n−1) ≡ x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(n−1), and by induction
Y(n) = Y(n−1)∪{(x(n), pn)}.
Remark 3.1. According to this result, a gamble or lottery is an outcome with its
own probability of winning or losing. Implicit in that statement is compound in-
variance by Prelec (1998) or the weaker reduction invariance by Luce (2001).
Lemma 3.6. {ψ(t(n)k ,ω)}2
n
k=1 is a monotone [increasing] sequence of homotopic
maps.
Proof. By definition ψ(t(n)k ,ω) is in the convex hull H . Since (Prelec, 1998,
pg. 498) showed that for any probability measure P, the inverted S-shape of
w(P) intersects the diagonal inclined at 45% to the horizontal at a fixed point
approximately p = 13; let pe be the fixed point of w(p) = p, and fix f ◦w ◦ pe =
λ (pe). So that ψ(t
(n)
k ,ω) = λ (pe)+ t
(n)
k (Y (ω)−λ (pe)) is a parametric curve in
t(n)k starting at the fixed point λ (pe). Let (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Y2n) be a sequence of lotteries
in Y (Ω). According to Lemma 3.5, if agents rank order outomes, then they rank
order lotteries a fortiori. Put ψ(t(n)k ,ω) in 1-1 correspondence with a rank ordered
lottery sequence Y(1),Y(2), . . . ,Y(2n). So that we have a coordinate map ψ(t
(n)
k ,ω) =
Y(2n−k+1)(ω). By construction ψ(t
(n)
k ,ω) ∈H is a parametric curve, i.e., a Peano
curve, mapping I into the plane, see (Guggenheimer, 1977, pp. 1,3), so each
point on its locus is unique and increasing in k. Thus, ψ(t(n)k ,ω) is monotone
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increasing in ranked lotteries.
Theorem 3.7 (Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem). (Karlin and Taylor, 1975,
pg. 259); (Doob, 1953, pp. 302-303). Let {Yn,Fn;n ≥ 0} be a martingale on
the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Fn,P), whereF =
⋃
n≥0Fn. Let τ(ω) be a
stopping time. If Pr{τ(ω) < ∞} = 1 and E[supn |Yτ∧n|] < ∞, then E[Yτ ] = E[Y0].

Theorem 3.8 (Doob-Meyer Decomposition). (Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001, pg.
474); (Dellacherie and Meyer, 1982, pg. 7). A submartingale {ψn,Fn;n ≥ 0}
with E[ψn]< ∞ may be uniquely expressed in the form:
ψn = Yn+ εn (3.25)
where {Yn,Fn;n≥ 0} is a martingale, and {εn,Fn;n≥ 0} is a previsible process.

Theorem 3.9. Let {Yn,Fn;n ≥ 1} be a fair gamble or lottery, i.e., a martingale.
Then {ψ(t(n)k ,ω), Fn;n≥ 1} is a submartingale, and {−ε(t
(n)
k ,ω)} is a previsible
increasing process.
Proof. The proof rests on Doob-Meyer decomposition in Theorem 3.8. By hy-
pothesis Yn is a martingale. Additionally by Lemma 3.6 ψ is an increasing se-
quence. Thus, E[ψ(t(n)k ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1] ≥ ψ(t
(n)
k−1). However, under Doob’s Optional
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Sampling Theorem in Theorem 3.7 and Equation 3.1 above
E[ψ(t(n)k ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1] = E[Y (ω)|Ft(n)k−1]+E[η(t
(n)
k ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1]
(3.26)
= Y0+E[η(t
(n)
k ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1]≥ ψ(t
(n)
k−1,ω)
(3.27)
where Y0 is the fair payoff for the lottery. Subtract η(t
(n)
k−1,ω) from both sides of
the inequality to get from equation (3.1)
E[η(t(n)k ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1]−η(t
(n)
k−1,ω)≥ ψ(t
(n)
k−1,ω)−Y0−η(t
(n)
k−1,ω) (3.28)
= η(t(n)k−1,ω)−η(t
(n)
k−1,ω) = 0 (3.29)
Hence
E[η(t(n)k ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1]≥ η(t
(n)
k−1,ω) (3.30)
For internal consistency with the stopped process in Proposition 3.2 we must have
−ε(t(n)k ,ω) = η(t
(n)
k ,ω). (3.31)
In which case we have a previsible increasing process.
18
4 Applications to Fair Gambles
In this section we apply some of the results above to subjects’ response(s)
to gambles. Let E be the objective expectations operator, and E˜ be the subjective
expectations operator. The homotopic lifting property posits
ψ(t(n)k ,ω) = Y (ω)+ ε(t
(n)
k ,ω) (4.1)
and that
ε(t,ω) ↓ 0 in t (4.2)
So that
P− lim
n,k→∞
(ψ(t(n)k ,ω)−Y (ω)) = P− limn,k→∞ ε(t
(n)
k ,ω) = 0 (4.3)
So that for fair gambles Y (ω), under Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem
E[ψ(·,ω)] = E[Y (ω)] = Y0 (4.4)
Choose ε sufficiently large so that the probability 1M(1− ε2) is small. (Berger,
1985, pp. 49-50) and (DeGroot, 1970, pp. 90-91) posited a set of “rationality
axioms” for construction of utility functions for preferences over probability dis-
tributions, in which probability measures are discrete. Thus, in what follows we
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use discretized probabilities. Also, Prospect Theory tells us that, generally, sub-
jects overweigh small probabilities and underweigh large probabilities10. So that
for
Pr{|ψ(t(n)k ,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε}=
1
M
(1− ε2) (4.5)
Let
Pr{ψ(t(n)k ,ω)< Y (ω)− ε}= θε (4.6)
Pr{ψ(t(n)k ,ω)> Y (ω)+ ε}=
1
M
(1− ε2)−θε (4.7)
Since all probabilities are small, the probability weighting function w implies
w(θε)> θε (4.8)
w(
1
M
(1− ε2)−θε)> 1M (1− ε
2)−θε (4.9)
By abuse of notation, assume that ε(τε ,ω) = ε(τε). In that setup the [uncondi-
tional] subjective expected value for the random variable ε(τε ,ω) is given by
E˜[ε(τε ,ω)] =−ε(τε)w(θε)+ ε(τε)w( 1M (1− ε
2)−θε) (4.10)
= ε(τε)[w(
1
M
(1− ε2)−θε)−w(θε)] (4.11)
10Ingersoll (2008) provided comparative statics of CPT which shows that the probability over[under]weighting
feature can be violated.
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For losses ` and gains g, let
w(θε) = θε +δ`, δ` > 0 (4.12)
w(
1
M
(1− ε2)−θε) = 1M (1− ε
2)−θε +δg, δg > 0 (4.13)
Upon further reduction we get
E˜[ε(τε ,ω)] = ε(τε)[
1
M
(1− ε2)+δg−δ`−2θε ] (4.14)
By the same token, the unconditional objective expected value of the same random
variable is
E[ε(τε ,ω)] = ε(τε)[
1
M
(1− ε2)] (4.15)
Comparison of the expected values in equations (4.14) and (4.15) show that the
quantity δg− δ`− 2θε is dispositive of a subject’s perception of the underlying
gamble.
4.1 Case i. Submartingale behavior for fair gambles
Assume that δg−δ`−2θε > 0. Thus, the unconditional subjective expected value
is greater than the unconditional objective expected value.
E˜[ε(τε ,ω)]> E[ε(τε ,ω)] (4.16)
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So that for any information setF
t(n)k−1
we have
E˜[E˜[ε(τε ,ω)|F
t(n)k−1
]]> E[E[ε(t(n)k−1∧ τε ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1]] (4.17)
⇒ E˜[ε(τε ,ω)|F
t(n)k−1
]> E[ε(t(n)k−1∧ τε ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1] (4.18)
= ε(t(n)k−1) (4.19)
So that for the stopped behavioral process, by virtue of Doob’s Optional Sampling
Theorem, we get
E˜[ψ(t(n)k ∧ τε)|Ft(n)k−1] = E˜[Y (ω)|Ft(n)k−1]+ E˜[ε(t
(n)
k ∧ τε ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1] (4.20)
Since subjects know that the gamble Y (ω) is fair, E˜[Y (ω)| F
t(n)k−1
] = Y0 under
Doob’s Optional Sampling. So that in collaboration with equation (4.19) we get
E˜[ψ(t(n)k ∧ τε)|Ft(n)k−1]> Y0+ ε(t
(n)
k−1∧ τε) (4.21)
= ψ(t(n)k−1∧ τε) (4.22)
Thus, the stopped behavioral process is a [strong] submartingale. The foregoing
results are summarized in the following
Proposition 4.1. Let (Ω,F ,{Ft},P) b a filtered probability space with discretized
right continuous filtration F
t(n)0
⊆ F
t(n)1
· · · ⊆ F
t(n)2n
. Let S be state space, and
Y be a fair gamble defined on Omega and taking values in outcome space X.
Let f ◦w ◦ P be a composite stochastic choice function defined on S×Ω. Let
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{ψ(t(n)k ,ω),Ft(n)k ;k = 1,2 · · · ,2
n} be a discretized behavior mimicking homotopic
sample path for deformation of stochastic choice into lotteries so that
ψ(t(n)k ,ω) = Y (ω)+ ε(t
(n)
k ,ω)
where ε(t(n)k ,ω) is measurement error. Let E˜ be the subjective expectations op-
erator for a subject taking a gamble Y (ω), and E be the corresponding objective
expectations operator, respectively, for probability measures P˜ and P defined on
Ω. Let P˜> P. Furthermore, define the stopping time
τε = inf{t ≥ 0| |ψ(t(n)k ,ω)−Y (ω)|> ε}, k = 1,2, · · · ,2n
(4.23)
Then
E˜[ψ(t(n)k ∧ τε ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1]> E[ψ(t
(n)
k ∧ τε ,ω)|Ft(n)k−1] (4.24)
= ψ(t(n)k−1∧ τε ,ω) (4.25)
is a submartingale.
4.2 Case ii. Supermartingale behavior for fair gambles
In this scenario, δg−δ`−2θε < 0, i.e. the inequality in equations (4.21) and
(4.22) is reversed, and we have a [strrong] supermartingale situation. Now subjects
tend not to gamble for sufficiently large deviations from the fair gamble that occur
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with small probability. That is the behavior mimicking ε-homotopy is the range
of admissible behavior. Subjects are risk averse, and evidently have strong loss
aversion.
4.3 Case iii. Probability leakage for fair gambles
The interesting case here is when δg− δ`− 2θε = 0. Presumably there is
no probability weighting because now w( 1M(1− ε2)) = 1M(1− ε2) we are in a
world of classic von Neuman-Morgenstern utility. Subjects know that the gam-
ble is a martingale. So expectaions for the stopped behavioral process coincide
E˜[ψ(t(n)k ∧ τε ,ω)| ·] = E[ψ(t
(n)
k ∧ τε ,ω)| ·]. However, the behavioral process was
stopped with probability 1M(1− ε2) before the behavior mimicking homotopic
sample path was completely deformed into the fair gamble. Additionally, in the
space-time density in equation (3.10), maxρ = M. So for a fair gamble we expect
psychological distance ρ to be uniformly distributed with probability 1M over the
interval11. Since subjects have “martingale beliefs”, they arguably assign equal
probability to winning or loosing at a given play of the gamble. In that case, the
corresponding conditional probability of winning [or losing] is given by
Pr{Winner| Fair gamble}=
1
2M(1− ε2)
1
M
(4.26)
=
1
2
(1− ε2) (4.27)
11This is an heuristic assumption motivated by Equation 3.14. There, as t→ ∞, Pr{ρ(·)> ε}= 1M . Evidently, in
the long run, the marginal distribution of the metric ρ coincides with that of the fair gamble Y (ω). Here “fair” means
each player has the same chance of winning. So that instead of 12 we assign a “martingale measure” of
1
M uniformly
to simplify computation without loss of generality.
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Thus, the subject’s chances of winning [or losing] is less than 12 . In fact, the total
probability of winning or loosing in this case is 1− ε2 < 1. The probability leak-
age of ε2 induces a subprobability measure on the decision space. To compensate
for this probability leakage subjects may have to renormalize the space-time prob-
ability density in equation (3.10) by replacing M with M(1− ε2). In that case,
ε ↓ 0⇒maxρ = M.
Perhaps most important, the subprobability feature implies that subjects as-
sign asymmetric weights for martingales. To see this, in the scenario just described
above, instead of a fair coin for deciding to gamble, let α be the weight assigned
to losing, and β be the weight assigned to winning. So that now the conditional
probabilities of loosing and winning is, respectively, α(1− ε2) and β (1− ε2).
The total probability associated with this event is (α+β )(1− ε2). That quantity
is equal to 1 if (α+β ) = (1− ε2)−1. Since 0 < ε < 1, α+β overweighs proba-
bilities of winning or losing. This result is consistent with Tversky and Khaneman
(1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory. However, here it was introduced in a fair
gamble in which agents have von Neuman-Morgenstern beliefs12. Therefore, our
behavior mimicking homotopy sample path is able to produce probability weight-
ing for modified Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) space-time probability densities.
We summarize this result with the following
Proposition 4.2. Let f (ρ, t) be a space-time probability density function for psy-
chological distance ρ . Let Y (ω) be a fair gamble. Assume that subjects have von
12Arguably, the catalytic relation w(p) = p implies a fixed point instead of a transformation of w(p) into p. In
which case the result is an artifact of coincidence.
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Neuman-Morgenstern preferences over probability distributions. Let ψ(t(n)k ∧ τε)
be a stopped behavior sample path. Assume that subjects know that Y (ω) is a fair
gamble, so that for ε > 0 small
Pr{|ψ−Y | ≥ ε}= 1
M
(1− ε2)
Then ε2 is probability leakage, and (1− ε2)−1 is the compensating probability
weight.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we augment Tversky and Khaneman (1992) Cumulative Prospect
Theory’s function space with: 1) a direct mapping from “states of nature”, dis-
torted by probability weighting, to state space; and 2) a mapping of lotteries from
“states of nature” to outcome space. We show that a commutative map of that aug-
mentation supports an ε-homotopy lifting property whereby composite stochastic
choice functions are deformed into outcomes [or gambles]. Due to measurement
error or otherwise, ε-homotopy sample paths are behavior mimicking processes
which are uniformly stopped by subjects’ behavior before the deformation goal
is reached. Moreover, we identify conditions under which subjects exhibit sub-
martingale, supermartingale, and probability leakage in response to fair gambles.
Our results show that the commutative prospect space provides a rich topology for
further research on construction of abstract behavioral stochastic processes that
26
enhance our understanding of experimental results.
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